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N “CONSTRUCTIVISM, AGENCY, AND THE PROBLEM of 
Alignment,” Michael Bratman considers how lessons from the philoso-
phy of action bear on the question of how best to construe the agent’s 
standpoint in the context of a constructivist theory of practical reasons. His 
focus is “the problem of alignment”: “whether the pressures from the gen-
eral constructivism will align with the pressures from the theory of agency” 
(Bratman 2012: 81). He thus brings two lively literatures into dialogue with 
each other. This is laudable. However, I shall argue that the considerations 
Bratman brings to bear from the literature on action do not support his con-
clusion that evaluative judgments are not constitutive of the agent’s stand-




Bratman’s focus is Sharon Street’s (2008) Humean metaethical constructiv-
ism. On this account, the fact that a consideration is a reason for an agent to 
do something is constituted by the fact that the judgment that this considera-
tion is a reason for this agent to do that thing withstands reflective scrutiny 
from the standpoint of the agent’s own evaluative judgments.1 My desire to 
dance is a reason for me to go to the dance party just in case and because my 
judgment that this desire is a reason for me to do so withstands scrutiny 
from the standpoint of my evaluative judgments. This is a constructivist ac-
count of practical reasons because facts about reasons for action are con-
structed through the process of reflective scrutiny, as opposed to dependent 
on normative facts that are prior to and independent of this process.2 It is a 
metaethical constructivism because it does not take any judgments about rea-
sons as given – in principle, at least, all normative judgments are proper ob-
jects of reflective scrutiny.3 And it is a Humean account because the con-
structed normative facts are contingent on the particular constitution of the 
                                                
1 Street puts the view in terms of “normative” judgments as opposed to “evaluative” judg-
ments. But she often refers to a suite of attitudes, of which normative judgments are a part, 
as “evaluative attitudes.” (See Berker (2014: 216, n. 2) on this point.) Since I will follow 
Bratman in taking Street’s to be a “Watsonian” view (see below), I will stick with the termi-
nology of value throughout to refer to what is supposed to constitute the agent’s standpoint. 
On Watson’s view, the agent’s standpoint is constituted by her commitments to the worth of 
various things. (See, esp., Watson (1975: 215).) But I will occasionally talk of “normative 
judgments” when I mean to refer to both evaluative judgments and judgments about rea-
sons. (They are not obviously the same thing.) 
2 The contrast here is with a realist account, according to which mind-independent norma-
tive facts ground facts about which reasons an agent has. 
3 The contrast here is with a “restricted” constructivism that takes the truth of certain nor-
mative facts as given and partly constitutive of the grounds for reflective scrutiny. 
I 
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agent’s standpoint – what reasons one has depends on the content of one’s 
set of evaluative judgments, however unique it may be.4 
Since my concern here is with Bratman’s objection to Street’s proposal 
that the agent’s standpoint is constituted by the agent’s evaluative judgments, 
I will put to one side certain issues about how, exactly, we are supposed to 
understand the process of reflective scrutiny. It is enough to work with the 
basic idea that an agent can take her judgments about the reasons she has to 
do various things as objects of reflection and consider how they mesh with 
her judgments about what is worthwhile. To illustrate, suppose I judge that 
dancing is worthless. This evaluative judgment will undermine my judgment 
that my desire to dance is a reason for me to go dancing, and so my judg-
ment about this reason will not survive reflective scrutiny. 
Now, since this is a metaethical constructivism, my judgment about the 
worth of dancing is fair game for scrutiny, and it may turn out that the thing 
to do is to repudiate my commitment to the worthlessness of dancing, rather 
than to revise my judgment about my reason to go dancing. In this scenario, 
it might turn out that, from the standpoint of my non-repudiated evaluative 
judgments, my desire to go dancing does survive scrutiny. 
Neurath’s boat is an apt metaphor here. I can scrutinize any of the ele-
ments of my set of normative judgments, but always from the standpoint of 
evaluative judgments that I do not, at that time, call into question. And a set 
of judgments that at one time served as part of the basis for my reflection 
may now itself be the object of scrutiny. It is, thus, possible for one to active-
ly change one’s set of evaluative judgments, and this may ground changes in 
one’s judgments about reasons and their correctness.5 
The core idea of Street’s view is that the correctness of my judgments 
about reasons depends on my scrutiny of these judgments from the stand-





Bratman distinguishes between two kinds of account of the agent’s stand-
point. The first he calls “Watsonian,” referencing the influential account of 
free agency developed by Gary Watson (1975), which takes the agent’s 
standpoint to be constituted by her values. Street’s view is of this first kind. 
The second kind of account is “Frankfurtian” because, following Harry 
Frankfurt (1988; 2004; 2006), it takes the agent’s standpoint to be constituted 
                                                
4 The contrast here is with a Kantian constructivism that takes the standpoint of all rational 
agents to have at least one element in common. 
5 This is one reason why Bratman’s (2012: 91-92) appeal to the fact that we can be alienated 
from certain of our evaluative judgments does not pose a problem for Street’s view. The 
possibility of repudiating one’s former values is a precondition for active participation in 
changes in one’s values. And we do not want to rule that out. (For more on this point, see 
Mitchell-Yellin 2015.) 
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by volitional commitments. Unlike evaluative judgments, Bratman claims, 
these Frankfurtian commitments do not bring with them intersubjective 
commitments to correctness. To illustrate, consider an example Bratman 
borrows from Sartre of the young man who is torn between staying home to 
tend to his sick mother and leaving to join in the resistance. He need not take 
his decision to join the Free French to involve any commitment to the claim 
that for someone else similarly situated it would be a mistake to choose oth-
erwise, nor must he, even implicitly, aim at social convergence on the judg-
ment that his decision was correct. He may simply have made a personal 
choice without taking it to have implications for others. His choice may have 
been grounded, not in his judgments about values or reasons, which do seem 
to entail intersubjective commitments to correctness, but rather in conative 
elements of his will, such as his higher-order volitions or policies about how 
to deliberate. 
The challenge to a Watsonian view such as Street’s is to account for the 
apparently undeniable role that Frankfurtian commitments play in structuring 
our practical deliberation, while simultaneously maintaining that the agent’s 
standpoint is constituted by her evaluative judgments. This seems difficult to 
pull off because evaluative judgments appear to entail intersubjective com-
mitments to correctness that Frankfurtian commitments do not. This is what 
Sartre’s case is supposed to show. But if that does not do the trick, then 
think of your love for your children (or anyone else). Presumably, you do not 
think that others would be mistaken if they failed to love your children as 
you do; nor do you take yourself to be aiming at effecting intersubjective 
convergence on your kids’ lovability. You simply love your children, and your 
love for them helps to constitute the standpoint from which you make judg-
ments about values and reasons. Playing Legos is worthwhile because that is 
what your kids like to do with you, and you take yourself to have reason to 
get up early in order to see them before school. Thus, your love for your 
children (at least partly) structures your practical standpoint. And it seems 
that we cannot make sense of a standpoint shaped by your love for your 
children simply in terms of evaluative judgments because this would require 
introducing unwarranted intersubjective commitments to correctness.6 
The Frankfurtian challenge that Bratman articulates seems quite force-
ful. The insight behind the challenge is that the agent’s standpoint is (at least 
partly) structured by elements that do not entail robust intersubjective com-
mitments to correctness. But, in the end, the challenge is unsuccessful. It 
centers on the claim that Frankfurtian commitments do not entail the inter-
subjective commitments to correctness that evaluative judgments do. As I 
shall now argue, this central claim, properly understood, is false, and there is 
                                                
6 An anonymous referee for this journal has suggested that we might make sense of this case 
in terms of judgments about agent-relative value. This seems to me to be a very interesting 
alternative to the line of reply I pursue here. There may be several (potentially compatible) 
ways in which Street might avoid the sting of Bratman’s Frankfurtian challenge. 
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a way of construing the agent’s standpoint as constituted by evaluative judg-




There are more worthwhile pursuits than can be fit into a single life; there are 
more valuable things than one person could possibly value.7 I judge that an 
ascetic life of meditation on a mountaintop is worthwhile, but it is just not 
for me. These considerations suggest that we need some way of marking the 
difference between judging something to be valuable and valuing it. Call an 
agent’s commitment to something, when she values that thing and does not 
merely judge it to be valuable, an evaluative commitment. An agent’s evaluative 
commitments will involve a proper subset of her total set of evaluative judg-
ments. 
What makes the difference between judging something valuable and val-
uing it? Let us borrow an account from Samuel Scheffler (2011).8 To value 
something involves four related tendencies: (i) to judge it valuable, (ii) to be 
emotionally attuned to it, (iii) to see oneself as having reason to be emotion-
ally attuned to it and (iv) to have certain motivations. Though I judge that the 
ascetic lifestyle is valuable, I am not motivated to practice it and find it ap-
propriate that I am not particularly sad that it does not seem to be in the 
cards for me. Though I exhibit one of the tendencies constitutive of valuing 
the ascetic lifestyle, I fail to exhibit any of the other three. Thus, my judg-
ment that the ascetic lifestyle is worthwhile is an element in my set of evalua-
tive judgments but is not an element of any of my evaluative commitments. 
Bratman claims that evaluative judgments come with intersubjective 
commitments to correctness. 9  And he contrasts them with Frankfurtian 
commitments in this regard. But now consider this claim in light of the dis-
                                                
7 Compare Scheffler (2011: 27) and Frankfurt (2004: 13). I borrow the meditation example 
from Frankfurt. 
8 Wallace (2013) develops the thought that valuing, in Scheffler’s sense, amounts to a certain 
kind of attachment with interesting implications for our practical lives and sentiments. 
9 There is extended discussion of this point in Bratman (2007b, esp. 151-54). But there is a 
sense in which that discussion seems too narrow: It focuses narrowly on comparative evalua-
tive judgments. It is not clear that the Watsonian theorist is best understood as claiming that 
the evaluative judgments that constitute the agent’s standpoint are comparative. The evalua-
tive judgments constitutive of the agent’s standpoint are about the worth of things, but not 
necessarily their comparative worth. The most plausible thing to say (though I do not have 
space to argue for it here) seems to be that the evaluative judgments constitutive of the 
agent’s standpoint are of the form “X is worthwhile” not “X is more worthwhile than Y.” 
The comparative judgments may be understood as derivative on the non-comparative judg-
ments. Elsewhere, I have characterized evaluative commitments as ends ranked in terms of 
worth. (See Mitchell-Yellin 2014.) It seems we would do well to think of non-comparative 
evaluative judgments as providing the stockpile of potential ends that are ranked in the for-
mation of the agent’s evaluative commitments. And we would do well to think of compara-
tive evaluative judgments as derivative on the agent’s evaluative commitments. 
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tinction just introduced, between evaluative judgments and evaluative com-
mitments. Two points stand out. 
First, it seems that evaluative judgments do not entail any relevant inter-
subjective commitments that Frankfurtian commitments do not also entail. 
To see this, consider a distinction between practical commitments, which 
structure one’s deliberation about what to do, and theoretical commitments, 
which structure one’s deliberation about what to believe. In light of this dis-
tinction, it seems that Bratman’s Frankfurtian challenge is best understood as 
focused on practical intersubjective commitments to correctness. These are 
the ones that help structure the agent’s standpoint in relevant ways. Is there a 
difference between what Frankfurtian commitments entail and what evalua-
tive judgments entail with respect to practical intersubjective commitments 
to correctness? 
It seems not. Consider the parallels between the following cases. While I 
do not value the ascetic lifestyle, I judge it valuable. And this seems to com-
mit me to thinking that everyone, myself included, should respect this life-
style.10 We should not prevent others from pursuing it. And I seem commit-
ted to trying to achieve social convergence on this point. It is not all the same 
to me if the ascetic lifestyle is outlawed. Similarly, Sartre’s young man may 
not be committed to thinking that it would be wrong for someone in his po-
sition to choose to stay with his ailing mother, but he does seem committed 
to thinking that everyone should respect his choice to join the resistance. 
And he seems committed to trying to achieve social convergence on this 
point. If his friends and family protested, he would surely plead his case and 
not simply throw up his hands or change his mind. Thus, it seems that my 
evaluative judgment and the young man’s Frankfurtian commitment entail 
the same practical intersubjective commitments to correctness. Call them 
commitments to respect. 
There does seem to be an obvious difference between the intersubjec-
tive commitments to correctness entailed by evaluative judgments and those 
entailed by Frankfurtian commitments. My judgment entails the commitment 
that others would be incorrect to judge otherwise. But this is a theoretical, 
not practical, commitment, and not an especially onerous one at that. It 
would be too much to claim that others would be incorrect were they to fail 
to make this judgment. The topic of asceticism might never cross their 
minds. It does seem appropriate to claim that, were the topic to occur to 
them, they should not make the contrary judgment, that this lifestyle is 
worthless. And it also seems appropriate to hold them to norms of respect 
with regard to this value. They should not prevent people from pursuing this 
lifestyle. But my judgment that the ascetic lifestyle is worthwhile does not 
seem to entail a commitment to anyone’s structuring her practical life around 
this value. I need not think that others should aim at engaging in this lifestyle. 
                                                
10 On the claim that values rationally require respect, and the distinction between this and 
engagement, see Raz 2001. 
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And my commitment to the correctness of my judgment does not generate 
any ends or projects of my own. It does not even entail that I adopt the ends 
of making others aware of the possibility of meditating on mountains and 
convincing them that it would be a worthwhile thing to do.11 
The upshot is this: Evaluative judgments may entail more intersubjective 
commitments to correctness than Frankfurtian commitments, but the differ-
ence is merely theoretical, about what judgments not to make, and not prac-
tical. The relevant intersubjective commitments to correctness are practical, 
and in this sphere both evaluative judgments and Frankfurtian commitments 
entail the same commitments to respect. 
Perhaps the source of these commitments to respect is different in the 
two cases. In the case of evaluative judgments, one might think that it is the 
content of the judgment that brings the commitment to respect in tow. The 
concept of worth entails the relevant commitments to respect. In the case of 
Frankfurtian commitments, perhaps the source is the standing of the one 
whose commitment it is. We are obliged to respect the determinations au-
tonomous agents give to their wills. These two options are not exhaustive or 
exclusive. And anyway, the issue seems to be beside the point. The Frankfur-
tian challenge turns on the claim that Frankfurtian commitments do not en-
tail the same intersubjective commitments to correctness as evaluative judg-
ments. The issue is whether there are the same commitments, not whether 
they are explained in the same way. And I have argued that, with regard to 
the commitments at issue – practical ones – the entailed intersubjective 
commitments are the same. 
Notice a second point about the relevance of the distinction between 
evaluative judgments and evaluative commitments. The insight behind the 
Frankfurtian challenge is that our wills are structured by elements that are 
distinct from evaluative judgments and do not entail practical intersubjective 
commitments to correctness. I have been arguing that it is wrong to account 
for this insight in terms of Frankfurtian commitments because they entail the 
same practical intersubjective commitments to correctness as evaluative 
judgments. But it does seem that evaluative commitments can do the trick. 
Evaluative commitments do not entail any more practical intersubjective 
commitments to correctness than are already bound up with the evaluative 
judgments they involve. I value the life of an academic philosopher. But this 
does not mean that I think someone like me who chose, instead, to meditate 
on a mountaintop would be making a mistake. Nor am I committed to 
                                                
11 I take the claims made here about the commitments entailed by evaluative judgments to be 
consistent with the basically internalist picture suggested by Watson (1975). As he puts it, the 
agent’s “valuational system” necessarily overlaps with her “motivational system.” In other 
words, evaluative judgments are necessarily motivating. This leaves open the nature of these 
motivations. One thing I am claiming here is that they need not be motivations to pursue or 
promote the object of the evaluative judgment. Rather, they may simply be motivations to 
respect and protect it. Evaluative commitments, on the other hand, do seem to entail further 
motivations to pursue and promote the things one values. 
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achieving social convergence on the value of philosophy. It is enough that 
others respect and do not interfere with my pursuit of one among many val-
uable careers. But these commitments to respect are already accounted for by 
my evaluative judgment that the life of philosophy is worthwhile. My evalua-





These reflections suggest that the central claim behind the Frankfurtian chal-
lenge, properly understood, is false. Evaluative judgments do not entail more 
practical intersubjective commitments to correctness than Frankfurtian 
commitments. Moreover, if we construe the agent’s standpoint as constituted 
by those evaluative judgments that overlap with the agent’s evaluative com-
mitments, we are able to capture the Frankfurtian insight that our practical 
standpoints are structured by individual commitments that outstrip our 
judgments about what is valuable. And we can do so while maintaining that 
evaluative judgments constitute the agent’s standpoint. 
But why would we want to do that? What is so important about holding 
on to the claim that evaluative judgments constitute the agent’s standpoint? 
In the context of Street’s metaethical constructivism, one advantage is that it 
allows for the process of scrutiny to operate on normative inputs. It is a 
normativity-in/normativity-out process. This allows the view to maintain its 
metaethical ambitions and avoid a nonnormative reduction or appeal to fun-
damental normative facts. Bratman recognizes that answering his Frankfur-
tian challenge would seem to require important concessions in this regard. If 




Sam Houston State University 




                                                
12 There may, however, be reason to think that Street’s view requires other important con-
cessions. For example, Michael Ridge (2012) has argued that Street’s view collapses into a 
more familiar metaethical subjectivism, something like the view developed by Bernard Wil-
liams (1981), according to which an agent’s reasons are a function of her desires. If so, this 
raises questions about why, precisely, Street’s view is constructivist – Williams’s view is not 
thought to be – and in what sense it is supposed to be a distinctive metaethical view. Exami-
nation of these issues would be interesting, and it may even be worth considering whether 
the distinction between evaluative judgments and evaluative commitments, which I invoke 
on Street’s behalf in response to Bratman’s Frankfurtian challenge, might be useful as well in 
responding to Ridge’s concerns. Unfortunately, I cannot consider these issues here. (I thank 
an anonymous referee for prompting me to mention them.) 
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